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Abstract 
In recent times policing has attracted a good deal of controversy, such as the paramilitary 
tactics employed at demonstrations, the use of stop and search powers under the Terrorism 
Act 2000, and the manner in which police officers are deployed on day-today duties. This 
paper outlines the role and potential of  police authorities to influence police policy and 
operations, and also highlights the need to seek greater citizen participation in holding the 
police to account. The major part of the paper draws on ground-breaking research on police 
authorities using questionnaire and in-depth interview data to outline just how it is that police 
authority members approach their duties. 
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Introduction 
There was no grand design for policing in England and Wales; its development was never 
logical or systematic but was moulded by the needs and fears of society and then evolved 
over time as those needs and fears fluctuated and changed (Critchley, 1978). The transition 
from watch committees, the role of the justices and their powers to appoint chief officers 
along with the significant impact of the various acts of Parliament all set the scene for our 
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current structure of policing and police authorities. Police authorities stand in a pivotal 
position to influence and improve upon our collective experience of policing, an experience 
in which the role of the citizen is crucial. Part of this paper discusses how the work of police 
authorities can and has impacted on participation by local citizens. As the bridge between 
local people and police forces, police authorities have a crucial role to play in building trust, 
gaining confidence and ensuring that the collective will is reflected in local policing.  
The system of police accountability secures its legitimacy only if those who are able to bring 
the police to account fully understand their roles and responsibilities and the mechanisms 
through which an account can be brought (Audit Commission, 2003b; Docking, 2003; Myhill 
et al, 2003). What we have in police authorities and the tripartite system is an arrangement 
which ought to facilitate transparency and a higher degree of accountability: in reality 
however there appears to be insufficient access and knowledge of the process or the methods 
by which the citizen can influence policing and by policing can be understood. According to 
Jones et al (1994: 27), there is confusion and this confusion is intentional.  
Police authorities are independent bodies and there is a police authority for each of the 43 
police forces in England and Wales. The duty of the police authority is to set the strategic 
direction for the local police force whilst holding the chief constable to account on behalf of 
the local community for the policing service delivered.  With the passing of the Police and 
Magistrates' Courts Act 1994 significant changes to both the composition and powers of 
police authorities came into force in England and Wales. The act made police authorities 
independent of local government and because combined, joint and single police authority 
structures were local government arrangements these structures became obsolete. The act also 
substantially reduced the size of police authorities and the numbers of elected councillors on 
them and independent members were introduced. As a result of the act, police authority 
membership consisted of 9 local councillors, 5 independent or appointed members and 3 
magistrate members, totalling 17 members. Some police authorities had slightly more 
members; for example, the Metropolitan Police Authority had 23 members which enabled it 
to more adequately represent London’s citizens.  The role of police authorities was further re-
defined under The Police Act 1996 which paved the way for police authorities to take on an 
acute scrutiny role and a more direct involvement in the policing of their local areas. The 
Police Act 1996 gave police authorities specific additional responsibilities which included the 
requirement to publish local policing plans in consultation with local communities and other 
interest groups. The act also gave police authorities the responsibility of monitoring 
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performance, collecting and publishing performance information, producing efficiency and 
Best Value performance plans, delivering best value, accounting for the constabulary's 
finances, managing the constabulary’s resources, planning and deciding budgets, 
investigating complaints against senior police officers and monitoring overall complaints 
procedures through to appointing chief police officer. 
The Crime and Disorder Act (1998) created Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRP) under which police forces and local authorities, in co-operation with police 
authorities and other agencies, were required to consult the public on a local audit of crime 
and disorder and a strategy for tackling them.  The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was a 
significant step forward in the drive towards increased accountability and representation 
because under it, and for the first time, local authorities became ‘responsible authorities 
having a statutory responsibility to develop local crime and disorder strategies with the local 
police. The onus for crime prevention was now a joint responsibility between the police and 
local authorities (Crime and Disorder Act, 1998: section 5 (1-3)). The act required that all 
authorities – which included police authorities – should conduct audits to review the levels 
and patterns of crime and disorder in their area and to publish an analysis of that review. The 
purpose of the crime and disorder audit is to inform the partnership of crime and disorder in 
their area and identify the methods of developing and implementing plans. An important 
requirement that was set out in the act was that the audit involved local people and 
consequently looked to develop a wider perspective of how crime impacted on the 
community and how the community could have an impact on it. Police authorities were 
however not afforded the same status as local authorities or the police service: the passing of 
the Police Reform Act (2002) rectified this and police authorities were then given the same 
status as police forces and local authorities on Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships. 
All police authorities are required to produce an annual policing plan which must consider the 
views of the local Community. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 provided the remit for 
partnerships to be inclusive of agencies and individuals in their area. There was however a 
fear that because local authorities had more resources than police authorities that local 
authorities would expect to have a greater degree of influence over the local police leaving 
the police authority with very little influence when agreeing policing priorities or as both 
parties attempted to reach their targets of crime reduction. This situation could potentially 
arise because police authorities do not appear to impact (directly) on operational policing in 
the same way as the activities of the Crime Reduction Partnerships at the local and district 
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level. At the end of their study of six police authorities Jones and Newburn (1997) concluded 
that although chief police officers still dominated policy and the planning process, the Police 
and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 gave police authorities potential strength that was yet to be 
applied in full. They concluded that if police authorities worked in a seamless way with the 
chief of police then there would be very little room for the authority to be undermined or 
sidelined at the local level. We can therefore see that police authorities are potentially more 
powerful than may be initially apparent. However, the degree of influence and power that 
they can exert is very much dependent on their ability to work in a unified way at the local 
level with local authorities, fire and rescue authorities, local health boards (in Wales), 
Primary Care Trusts (PCT) as outlined in The Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
Accountability and Citizen Participation 
According to the Policy Studies Institute (1997), despite initial criticisms that the Police and 
Magistrate Court Act 1994 represented an attack on democratic accountability, there was 
evidence that local police authorities were actually re-invigorated as a result of it. The Policy 
Studies Institute (1997) also found that the most criticised aspects of the act - the reduction in 
police authority size and the introduction of appointed independent members - made police 
authorities more active and influential and rather than increasing central control, many forces 
and police authorities had used local policing plans to introduce a range of local police 
objectives, including crime prevention and quality of life issues such as traffic calming 
measures and road safety. Notwithstanding this, however, police authorities were effectively 
less democratic and their local plans had to take account of national issues which at times 
were at odds with local concerns. Moreover, the police authority is also dependent on the 
police service through the commissioner or the chief constable to relay information to them 
via reports presented to the police authority. Baldwin and Kinsey (1982) and Marshall (1978) 
highlight section 12.3 of the Police Act 1964 because it provides chief constables with an exit 
clause if they think that by submitting a report it would result in the disclosure of sensitive 
information that could jeopardize or influence operational policing. Chief constables are 
permitted to refer such requests for a report to the Home Secretary who has the final decision 
on what if anything is presented. This places the police authority at the mercy of the police 
service (Day & Klein, 1987). It is quite possible that the Home Office and the chief constable 
could agree to support each other in decisions to the exclusion of the police authority 
(Lustgarten, 1986; Baldwin and Kinsey, 1982; Marshall, 1978). Lustgarten (1986) sees this 
level of dependency as unsatisfactory and for Jones et. al. (1994: 27) the ‘tripartite system is 
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ambiguous, not at all transparent and [this confused arrangement is in their opinion] 
intentionally constructed’. The reality is that many of the powers conferred on the police 
authority are only exercisable through the authority of the Home Secretary. Even though 
there have been a number of acts of Parliament reorganising our police service and the role of 
the police authority within the tripartite structure, very little has actually changed - since the 
Metropolitan Police Act 1839 - to alter the spread of power between the members of the 
tripartite system. The potential for further confusion or tension is heightened by the fact that 
police authorities – in their current form - are a newly introduced partner juxtaposed between 
two long established institutions - the Home Office and the police service - that have 
developed strong working ties and systems of operation over many years. Finally, police 
authorities are further challenged by their primary duty to secure the maintenance of an 
’adequate and efficient’ force for their area (The Police 1964 Act, section 4.1; APA, 2005; 
Boateng, 1985: 238) which could be seen as in conflict with their scrutiny role. 
Representation Trust and Accountability 
The policing issues which concern local people can be highly emotive and there are a 
multitude of voices vying to be heard; questions are inevitably asked as to why there are such 
low levels of participation from the public. It is therefore questionable how effective police 
authorities are in representing the diverse views of those they are serving. The level of 
participation and the frequency of consultation are in themselves an insufficient barometer of 
accountability. The Audit Commission (2003a; 2003b) conducted research on accountability, 
public trust and confidence in public services. The Commission found that people trusted 
individuals much more than organisations because the notion of trust was based on 
relationship, familiarity and experience. The report found that public trust in the 
accountability structures of public organisations was driven by various factors including 
useful and credible information, the existence of external watchdogs, personal contact, and - 
unsurprisingly - whether they were seen to be honest and trustworthy (Audit Commission, 
2003a). The Audit Commission rated the police as the worst of three services in providing 
information although the police was the institution that was seen as most likely to be 
controlled by an independent watchdog. The Audit Commission (2003a) found that generally, 
public trust in local authorities was low and the reason that it was much lower in the police 
was primarily because the public did not think that the police would listen to their views and 
also that public awareness of the regulators was low. 
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Having being charged with certain responsibilities, duties and functions police authorities 
have an obligation to be directly accountable to the communities within their geographic 
boundaries as much as they are accountable to the Home Secretary and chief constables 
within the tripartite structure. In the first instance accountability to the local community is of 
paramount importance because it is here that the effects of policing or lack of it will be felt. 
For particular groups, the distinction between operational and non-operational policing is 
irrelevant because their primary experience is confrontational and adversarial. The 
preoccupation with the tripartite structure implicitly denies the place and importance of the 
citizen. It is important for the effective functioning of the police that we begin to 
acknowledge that the tripartite system is in fact a quartet of Home Secretary, chief 
constables/commissioners, police authorities and the citizen. The system ought to work on 
behalf of the citizen not the citizen on behalf of it. Scarman (1986, 4.60) noted; ‘…[the 
police] enforce the law on behalf of the community; indeed they cannot effectively enforce it 
without the support of the community’.  
 
Public knowledge of the existence of police authorities is crucial if the authority is to be 
effective and have the credibility required to undertake its role. Both Myhill et al (2003) and 
Docking (2003) in their respective research found little public awareness about police 
authorities and their roles. The call for greater public accountability dictates that the 
institutional mechanisms set up to bring about that accountability have: a) sufficient 
expertise, b) that there is knowledge of the institution its role and mechanisms, c) that it is 
resistant to being unduly influenced and d) that it has the resource capability to deliver.  
In most cases the above requirements have indeed been met.  For example, police authorities 
arguably have the basic structural framework, resources and relevant powers to enable them 
to perform their functions. They have responsibility for setting the police budget; they have 
the additional resources and expertise of its members who are magistrates, independent and 
local authority members. There is also the appointment of civil staff whose role it is to 
support the appointed members in their work for the authority. Both police authority 
members and the civil staff work closely with the local police force to produce local policing 
plans and the chief constable or commissioner reports on a monthly basis to the authority on 
the activities of the force.  
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In addition to the above, there have been calls for the strengthening of police authorities 
which have, according to Jones and Newburn (1997), sprung from concerns that the division 
of responsibility between the Home Office, police authorities and chief constables is 
deliberately confusing and thereby obscures the decision making process; and secondly, that 
there is a shift of power away from police authorities to the Home Office and chief constables 
(Reiner, 1992). The compound effect of this according to Jones et al (1994) is that there are 
very few checks and balances in the system not only because police authorities and its 
members have insufficient knowledge but also they lack the formal powers they need to exert 
real influence. 
 
Moreover, Jones and Newburn (1997) found that police authorities were increasingly 
preoccupied and focussed on managerial and organisational issues rather than the strategic 
policy issues governing local policing. The researchers concluded that there was a move 
towards a calculative and contractual accountability as opposed to accountability based on 
explanation and cooperation. There is, therefore, a growing feeling that police authorities 
have little real control or power and are unable to bring chief constables and their police 
services to account (Reiner, 1991; Loveday and Reid, 2005; Jones and Newburn, 1997).  
Methodology 
There are approximately 760 police authority members in the 43 police authorities in England 
and Wales. In November and December 2007 questionnaire surveys were sent to all police 
authorities and initially 81 were returned. In January 2008 a further 200 questionnaires were 
sent out and a further 27 completed questionnaires were received, totalling 108 (14.2%). 
Some police authorities have generic email addresses where all correspondence is filtered to 
the police authority member by Member Services. However, where direct contact details 
were available the questionnaire was sent directly to individual police authority members. 
Some police authorities such as Hertfordshire Police Authority have a designated member to 
respond on behalf of the police authority.  While the total number of respondents that 
returned completed questionnaires was 108, the total number of responses  for each question 
varies considerably as some respondents provided multiple answers to some questions.  
New empirical ground has been covered by this research as the literature reveals no similar 
survey which has focused on police authority members. In addition, 24 semi-structured, in-
depth interviews were conducted with specific individuals who are significant gatekeepers 
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between the community, the police service and the police authority. Interviewees included 17  
police authority members, a former Home Secretary,  the Chairman of the Association of 
Police Authorities, the Executive Director of the Association of Police Authorities, the Policy 
Officer of the Association of Police Authorities, the Clerk to the Metropolitan Police 
Authority, a former chief constable and a grade 5 civil servant. All interviewees in this 
research were advised that if they wished to remain anonymous or if they wanted to speak off 
the record, they were free to do so. Anonymous interviews enabled the researchers to draw 
out important issues to the phenomenon being studied by allowing participants to describe in 
detail their experiences.  
Between 1964 and 1994 there has been a small body of work on police authorities (Jones & 
Newburn, 1997; Brogden, 1977; Reiner, 1991). In the last decade, however, this paper sets 
out the most recent academic work on police authorities and is the only academic work to 
look at the role of police authorities in the context of citizenship and accountability. The 
current paper explores the following: 
a) The relevancy of police authorities, their potential and their actual impact,  
b) The role of police authorities in relation to the citizen, the police service 
and accountability. 
c) The views of police authority members on how they perceive their role and 
the role of the police authority. 
 
Findings 
This research has shown that 68 out of the 126 (54%) responses by police authority members 
to the question of responsibility accepted that the police authority was ultimately responsible 
for policing in their area and as far as responsibility was concerned they ranked the police 
service and the Home Office in second (29) and third (21) place respectively (Fig.1). 
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Figure.1  Who is ultimately responsible for policing?
 
 
The question of ‘who is ultimately responsible for policing’ was – in effect – a statement of 
duty rather than legal responsibility. Whilst members accepted that responsibility for policing 
ultimately lay with them as police authority members, further analysis of the responses 
reveals a clear disconnection between the perceived balance of responsibility (Fig.1), the 
right to make final decisions in disputes (Fig.2), and the perceived possession of power 
(Fig.3). Responses to Figure.3 show that whilst members felt the police authority had the 
least power within the tripartite system, they perceived that it had the most responsibility. 
This viewpoint was further reinforced when members responded to the question: ‘who they 
thought had the final decision in disputes?’’ (Fig.2). The overwhelming view was that the 
Home Secretary clearly had the final decision. In-depth interviews with police authority 
members shed further interesting light on this issue.  One independent member of Llandudno 
Police Authority forcibly emphasised during the interview that wherever the power and final 
decision lay, it was most definitely not with the police authority.  He explained:  
‘... I sometimes ask in a meeting  - and publicly - if we vote against this [action, 
policy or direction] what will happen? and the answer is that it will go ahead 
anyway!’ 
Figure.2  In disputes who has the final decision? 
21
29
68
3 5
Home office Police Service Police
Authority
Tripartite Other
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Fig.2 shows that the vast majority of the sample believe that the Home Secretary has the final 
decision in disputes. Fig.3 also provides contemporary support to the position expounded by 
Reiner (1991) that the Home Secretary and chief constable hold the balance of power. Reiner 
(1991) observed that during the dispute over the purchase of plastic bullets and CS gas in 
Northumbria, the chief constable got his way primarily because the police authority could 
only exercise influence as long as the chief constable and the Home Office permitted the 
police authority to do so. Even though the police authority appealed against the original 
decision, the Court of Appeal rejected their appeal on the grounds that the Home Secretary 
had powers under the Royal Prerogative to do what he felt was necessary in order to keep the 
Queen’s Peace (Reiner, 1992: 240). According to Reiner (2000: 189) and Brogden (1977) in 
cases of real conflict between a chief constable and his police authority not only would the 
chief constable always prevail but the police authority would defer to the expertise of the 
chief. 
Figure.3  Where does the balance of power reside? 
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 In relation to the tripartite system, the questionnaire asked where police authority members 
thought the balance of power rested. The results are interesting because even though Her 
Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) sits outside the formal tripartite system arrangement, thirteen 
police authority members felt that HMT wielded sufficient power and in fact had more power 
than the police authority and came close to the power and influence of the chief constable 
(Fig.3). During an in-depth interview, a councillor member of Cumbria Police Authority 
explained that those members who saw the Treasury as an important power base did not quite 
understand how public finances worked. He explained that the balance of power was - in his 
opinion – tilted in favour of the Home Office. Interestingly, he also cited that the Association 
of Chief  Police Officers (ACPO) potentially wielded more power than the police authority or 
the police authority’s representative organisation the Association of Police Authorities 
(APA). 
Closer analysis of Fig.3 suggests that there is a lack of understanding by a large number of 
police authority members of their budgetary powers to effect change. Fig.1 reflects that 
police authority members accept their responsibility: however, the collective responses 
between figures 1, 2, and 3 suggest that much more needs to be done to train and re-skill 
members. This concurs with the views of a clerk of a police authority who explained during 
interview that because the police authority receives the funds and is responsible for the 
budget, it is crucially important for members to understand fully the budget and the impact it 
has on policing. 
The former Home Secretary Rt Hon Charles Clarke MP saw the balance of power as 
primarily residing with the chief constable and saw that the onus was on the police authority 
to find a way to work with the chief of police whom he saw as controlling operational 
83
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policing. Reiner (1991) noted that over time there had been a detrimental shift of power away 
from police authorities to chief constables.  An independent member of Llandudno Police 
Authority felt that the relationship was ‘...more about influence rather than power’ which 
suggested that far from the ‘self limiting’ description of Jones et al (1994: 62), the police 
authority was able to exercise its influence through a more complex process of negotiation 
rather than through the overt display of power.  
According to a councillor member of Sussex Police Authority: ‘the Home Office consistently 
tries to tip the balance in its own favour but the police authority’s role is to remind them [the 
Home Office] that the local view is of crucial importance.’  
Figure.4  Within the tripartite system is the police authority proactive or reactive?
 
 
On the question of whether members thought their police authority was proactive or reactive, 
Fig.4 shows that over 81 of the 157 responses indicated their belief that the police authority 
was more reactive than proactive. Despite this, an independent member of the Metropolitan 
Police Authority saw the police authority as primarily a proactive body; setting the agenda, 
the tone and actively pursuing issues. He argued that in order to effectively fulfill its role 
police authorities had to be proactive. A councillor member of Sussex Police Authority 
explained that as a police authority Sussex tried to be proactive but ‘...at the end of the day 
we are lay people and are not involved 24 hours a day, seven days a week’. Other 
interviewees also echoed this and saw their police authorities as more reactive than proactive.  
Typical of this view was the following: ‘...there is a degree of inevitability because just in 
71
81
5
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terms of energy and resources there is a squad of people [police and civil staff] paid and 
working fulltime... this is where the power lies’.  
Figure.5 Who do members represent? 
 
 
Eighty four members (Fig.5) saw themselves as primarily representing the residents in their 
local areas while 39 saw that they had a responsibility to represent the police authority. What 
is clear is that in order for police authorities to be effective there needs to be a balance 
between the responsibilities of members to represent and consult with local people - which is 
a responsibility given to police authorities under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 
(1984), the Police and Magistrates Courts Act (1994) and the Crime and Disorder Act (1998) 
- and the responsibility of the police authority under the provision of the Police Act (1964) 
(section 4.1) ‘to secure the maintenance of an adequate and efficient police force for the 
area’. The job description for police authority members clearly reflects this aspiration stating 
that members are appointed to fulfill a dual role; ‘… to represent the views of the police 
authority within local communities and the views of local communities to the authority’ 
(Leicestershire Police Authority, 2007). 
 
Figure.6 Are members doing enough to represent those identified in Fig.5? 
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 Figure.7  Is the police authority doing enough to represent its constituents? 
 
 
On the question of whether police authorities were doing enough to represent residents, the 
police service and the wider community, 73 responses (Fig.7) indicated that members thought 
their police authority was doing enough to represent those within its remit and area of 
responsibility. Even though 61 responses (Fig.6) indicated that members felt that they and 
other members like themselves were doing enough to represent those they had identified in 
Fig.5, 39 members (Fig.6) indicated that as members they were not doing enough whilst 18 
were unsure about whether they were doing enough to represent effectively. 
 
At the heart of the question of whether police authority members are doing enough to 
represent the interests of those who depend on them is the question of whether members 
61
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know how to bring the chief constable/commisioner to account and more specifically what 
questions to ask. According to Day & Klein (1987) police authority members lack sufficient 
knowledge and understanding resulting in them being unable to ask the right questions. This 
situation is made worse because members are unaware of their legal powers which invariably 
render them relatively powerless and unable to exert real influence or control. One 
Metropolitan Police Authority member explained that in her experience, 
‘... in order to know what questions to ask you read a lot! The commissioner is at our 
behest and we know what to ask by doing our own research in the same way 
journalists do. If we attend meetings and expect things to be handed to us we are not 
doing our job’. 
A councillor member of Sussex Police Authority and a councillor member of North 
Yorkshire Police Authority both argued that local knowledge and experience were vital if 
members were to be effective and to know what to ask. 
An independent member of Llandudno Police Authority explained that members are 
appointed not as experts but because they have been ‘round the block’ and the variety of 
experience that comes to the authority particularly from those with public sector experience is 
considerable. This response implies that members are pragmatic and aware that their scope of 
effectively holding the police to account is potentially restricted by the resource and time 
implications that go along with the terms of their appointment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.8  How effective are Community Police Consultative Groups (CPCG)? 
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Figure.9  Do they attract a representative audience? 
 
Given the importance of consultation, 47 members saw Community Police Consultative 
Groups (CPCG) as very or fairly effective and 58 thought CPCGs were hardly or not at all 
effective (Fig.8). The overwhelming view amongst those police authority members who 
responded to this particular question was that where the old consultative arrangements were 
still in place 77 (76%) out of 101 responses indicated that the forums did not attract a 
sufficiently representative audience (Fig.9).  One Metropolitan Police Authority member 
colourfully described CPCG’s ‘...some of them are really shit! Some of them are really 
good...’. 
 
Figure.10  Can accountability be strengthened by electing police authority chairs and 
members? 
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According to Howard (2005), and Loveday and Reid (2003) accountability could be 
enhanced and supported by the direct election of officials including police authority members 
and chief constables/commissioners. The results from this survey have shown that whilst 52 
police authority members believed that accountability could and would be strengthened by 
electing police authority chairs and members (Fig.10), there was no evidence to support the 
assertion that the process of elections would make the work of the police authority more 
accountable or indeed more effective. A councillor member of Cumbria Police Authority 
explained that ‘electing members would be stupid and electing chief constables would be 
equally stupid!’  An independent member of the Metropolitan Police Authority also 
supported this position and explained that elections would not make the police authority more 
efficient and that she was certain that the elected route would simply maintain the status quo 
by electing white male professionals.  
A  former chair of the Metropolitan Police Authority agreed with the prevailing view of 
interviewees in this research that electing chief  officers made very little sense; ‘... the 
electoral process would not [in my opinion] give you professional competence, but different 
skills.’ He did however echo a similar view to that articulated by Loveday and Reid (2003: 
59) that ‘electing the chair of police authorities had some virtue because it would give clear 
political accountability’. However, what was more important to this interviewee was the  
diversity brought to the police authority by independent and magistrate members who may 
not otherwise have gained a place on the police authority through an elective process. 
Figure.11 Would electing members be more democratic than appointments? 
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Even though 57 respondents thought that electing police authority members would be more 
democratic than a recruitment process (Fig.11), the reality is that the merits of appointing 
through a recruitment process cannot be assessed against that of an electoral one because both 
processes are attempting to select people using different criteria. The overwhelming majority 
of interviewees accepted that whilst an elected system would be more democratic, selecting 
members through such a process was far less desirable. One Metropolitan Police Authority 
member asked: ‘why would you elect a commissioner of police when you do not elect the 
head of the fire service or the head of any other similar service?’ Loveday and Reid (2003) 
were also of the opinion that if all members were elected, the lack of independent non-
politically partisan members on police authorities would not be good for local communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure.12 Would elected chief constables improve accountability and give the local 
community a greater say? 
57
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On the prospect of electing chief  constables or commissioners, 92 members (Fig.12) did not 
believe that elections would improve accountability or increase the voice of the local 
community and there was consensus that trained professional police were best placed to fill 
these roles as opposed to professional politicians.  
‘… Policing is a professional responsibility and any suggestion of political influence 
in the appointment of a senior officer would be a mistake’ (former Home Secretary Rt 
Hon Charles Clarke MP). 
A councillor member of Sussex Police Authority added that ‘… an elected chief is far too 
American for my liking ….’. Thirty respondents believed that directly electing chief 
constables/commissioner would result in a reduction in accountability because this 
accountability would be to the electorate and not accountability in terms of stewardship 
(Pyper, 1996), rectification (Mulgan, 2003: 30) or ‘the ability to impose a cost’ (Keohane, 
2002: 479). Forty seven respondents believed elected chief  constables would have no impact 
whatsoever and only 13 respondents thought that there would be an increase in 
accountability. 
 
 
Figure.13 Do you think the citizen knows about police authorities? 
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Even though 84 police authority members saw their primary role as representing local people 
(Fig.5) 86 members felt that the citizen did not know about the police authority (Fig.13) and 
13 members were unsure whether or not the citizen knew about them.  
Figure.14 Do you think citizens are aware of the distinction between the police service 
and the police authority 
 
 
On the question of whether the public was aware of the distinction between the police 
authority and the police service, the overwhelming view was that 86 out of 107 responses 
indicated that the distinction was known.  
 
Figure.15 Do national policing plans contradict local priorities? 
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On the question of whether national policing plans were at odds with local priorities, 53 
members believed that the plans did impact negatively or contradict local priorities versus 49 
who did not (Fig.15). One police authority member explained that in the larger city areas 
there was no conflict between local and national plans because local plans were heavily 
dictated by the national agenda - which in itself the member argued served to demonstrate the 
dominance of the Home Office. The member went on to explain that in the provincial towns 
there was a real possibility of conflict; for example, if the national concern is with level 2 
criminality (cross border issues affecting more than one basic command unit) but the local 
area is concerned with level 1 criminality (local crimes within a BCU).  An independent 
member of Staffordshire Police Authority agreed that this sort of conflict did indeed occur 
but added that there was some inevitability to this, as some issues such as terrorism must be a 
national priority even though at times its implementation could conflict with local concerns.  
Another interviewee from the Metropolitan Police Authority argued that the potential for 
conflict depended on the personality of the chief constable/commissioner and explained that 
chiefs of police were at times arrogant and this would have a significant affect on priorities. 
In another interview a member explained that he knew of one police authority where the 
members could not visit the police without the chief constable being informed first and 
agreeing to the visit. What Reiner (1991) found, however, was that most chief constables 
made efforts to develop good working relationships with their police authorities in order to 
ensure that policing policy was largely in tune with local needs.  
Finally, given the complex and sometimes onerous duties placed on police authority 
members, the level and quality of training they receive should be mentioned. Whilst 96 
53
49
6
yes no unsure
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members had received regular training and 13 did not, 38 members thought that the training 
they had received was insufficient for the tasks they were expected to undertake: four 
members were unsure of its usefulness, whilst 25 respondents thought the training was 
sufficient. Only 29 reported that the training had been good. 
Conclusion 
This research has found that where there is a high level of expectation and acceptance of the 
need for consultation and communication; a significant number of police authority members 
believe that the police authority is not doing enough to represent local people. Furthermore, a 
significant number of  police authority members questioned their own usefulness and what it 
was that they and the police authority were doing as far as representation was concerned.  
Police authorities need to overhaul their consultative arrangements. Elliott and Nicholls 
(1996) found that police authorities tended to rely heavily on traditional police community 
style meetings but by 2003 Dalgleish et al (2003) found that police authorities had begun to 
reassess their methods of consultation. Raine et al, (2006) explained that good accountability 
depended on good communication processes and they cited that neighbourhood policing was 
an exciting development which if adequately resourced could deliver much in terms of public 
reassurance. In 2005, the Association of Police Authorities (APA) established twelve 
‘Accountability Pilots’ led by police authorities and found that Bedfordshire, Merseyside, 
North Wales, Suffolk and Thames Valley each offered valuable opportunities for 
participation and learning by police authority members. The APA concluded that attendance 
at Neighbourhood Action Groups which had been established across Thames Valley, the 
Neighbourhood Panels in Ipswich and Suffolk and the various PCCG/CPCG and Police and 
Community Together (PACT) meetings would enable police authority members to hear at 
first hand how neighbourhood policing was working. The key priority as identified by the 
APA was to give opportunity for dialogue and exchange. It is clear from this research that 
failure to provide these opportunities will see police authorities become increasingly 
irrelevant to people’s everyday experience of policing. 
 
One of the challenges for police authorities is to ensure that they are not seen as the mouth 
piece of the police service simply justifying and informing the community of what the police 
are doing (Day & Klein, 1987; Marshall, 1978; Reiner, 2000). The other challenge for police 
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authorities is that local people do not know – in sufficient number - that police authorities 
exist and therefore do not see themselves as having the opportunity to influence local policing 
through the police authority. This problem is further augmented by the fact that police 
authority members see the police authority as having minimal power. 
 
Participation through consultation is therefore only meaningful if people’s views can be seen 
to make a difference and to influence the development of policy. The litmus test of inclusion 
is therefore not only evidenced through participation, but in order to be viable, it must do 
more than simply getting people to talk, ‘people must decide and do things’ (McHugh & 
Parvin, 2005: 22). In addition to a rigorous process, what is needed is a sense and expectation 
that change may ensue from one’s participation (Hoban, 2004; Parekh, 2002; Coleman, 
2005). 
The importance of police authority members establishing and developing local links and 
having local knowledge and contact is crucial if police authorities are to build trust. The 
Audit Commission (2003a) concluded that the notion of trust was based primarily on 
relationships, familiarity and experience and that people trusted individuals far more than 
organisations. The findings from this research conclude that police authorities need to do 
more to communicate what they are doing in terms of their governance and the arrangements 
for local policing. Secondly, the public needs to demand more from their police authority 
members – who are in fact their ambassadors. If police authorities continue to be ambivalent 
on the question of whether or not they are doing enough to represent local interests it is 
difficult to see how police authorities will ever be truly effective or trusted. 
This research has uncovered that police authority members charged with this important 
responsibility have a low level of trust in their own abilities and the rigour with which they 
are representing the interests of the wider community. Police authorities can only be effective 
if members are confident in their own abilities, if they know what it is that they are doing, if 
they know what it is that they are supposed to do, if they have the confidence and sufficient 
tools to bring the chief constable/commisioner to account and if they know what questions to 
ask.  A Grade 5 civil servant interviewee argued that far too many police authorities and in 
particular police authority clerks tended to be fearful of their chief constables/commissioners 
and they showed an alarming level of deference to them. The civil servant went on to explain 
that where challenges did take place they occurred within very narrow and ‘almost’ agreed 
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boundaries which could lead one to conclude that policing by consent was by prior 
arrangement between the police authority and the commissionser and not by the public. On 
the issue of knowing which questions to ask, according to Day & Klein (1987), police 
authority members lacked sufficient knowledge and understanding resulting in them being 
unable to ask the right questions. This situation is made worse because members are unaware 
of their legal powers, which invariably renders them less able to exert real influencel.  
However, this research has shown that a full understanding of the legal parameters of their 
powers may in fact have very little direct impact on the ability of the police authority to bring 
the police to account. What many police authority members have argued is that what is 
needed is an inquisitive mind and the ability to investigate. At its optimum, the police 
authority is a proactive, innovative and dynamic institution, supported by knowledgeable 
members who in turn are supported by a robust secretariat. At its minimum police authorities 
can be seen as functionally procedural institutions in so far as they work within the strictures 
which the other two members of the tripartite system permit them to work within. It is still 
unclear where police authority members see police authorities on the scale ranging from 
dynamism to functionally procedural. 
The perceptible shift of power away from police authorities in favour of the Home Office and 
chief constables does not automatically mean that police authorities are unable to discharge 
their responsibilities. What it does mean however is that police authorities are somewhat 
restricted and constrained due to uncertainty about their remit and their position in the 
tripartite system. As previously discussed, chief constables can appeal directly to the home 
secretary and refuse to amend or to elaborate on a report that they present to their police 
authority. This leverage can directly undermine and inhibit the scrutiny function of the police 
authority. The possibility of chief constables to circumvent their police authorities in this way 
should be limited because the chief constable should be responsive to the wishes of his 
employer - the police authority.  
The former Conservative Party leader Rt Hon Michael Howard MP in his speech ‘Respect for 
Others’ in Manchester (2005) suggested that increased accountability could be achieved by 
scrapping remote and unaccountable police authorities and replacing them with directly 
elected local police commissioners. Mr Howard insisted that elected commissioners would 
improve accountability and give the public a more direct say in the running of their local 
police forces and increase the citizen’s influence over the type of policing and police 
priorities in their local areas. During an interview with the then Shadow Home Secretary - 
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Chris Grayling MP - he explained that the Conservative Party’s position was now more in 
favour of directly elected chairs of police authorities rather than elected police 
commissioners. 
Given the inability of police authorities to influence, adequately represent the citizen, or to 
challenge the police, it would be easy to conclude that police authorities should be dissolved 
or like Rt Hon Michael Howard MP that they should have all their powers transferred to an 
elected mayor. Neither of these options is desirable because, transferring police authority 
powers to a mayor – as opposed to a Mayor chairing a police authority - would see power 
concentrated in too few hands and the legitimacy of a single official deciding and 
implementing policing policy would be questionable. There is also the other issue which is 
that policy would then become even more politically partisan as seen when the Mayor of 
London, Boris Johnson withdrew his support for the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police Service resulting in the Commissioner - Sir Ian Blair tendering his resignation. 
Whilst police authorities have a statutory responsibility to consult with the public in order to 
determine annual local policing priorities, there is no similar responsibility placed on the 
police service to consult with police authorities. A statutory responsibility should be placed 
on the police service that it must consult with its police authority. Bob Jones (Chair of the 
APA) explained that police authorities have a statutory right to ask the chief constable to 
report on any issue, however, the onus was on police authorities to ask questions rather than 
the police service to tell; a statutory responsibility reversing this and placing the onus on the 
police service would begin to address this imbalance.  
Police authorities can also influence the national policy agenda through their representative 
body the, Association of Police Authorities (APA). In 2006 the APA’s joint report with 
ACPO on the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) provided a positive picture of the 
APA and ACPO working together and calling on the government to acknowledge and 
address the funding gap which arose as a result of the Comprehensive Spending Review 
(APA, 2006). The APA has had other notable successes, for example, its response to the 
Home Affairs Committee inquiry into police reform and the subsequent Police Reform Act 
2002 and the visible role played by the Chairman of the APA (Bob Jones) in resisting the 
proposed police mergers. However according to a number of interviewees the secretariat of 
the APA needs to be more robust, dynamic and confident in leading the policy debate on 
policing and in influencing the direction of travel of policy now and into the future. One area 
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that the Association of Police Authorities could begin looking at is staffing. For police 
authorities to efficiently discharge their responsibilities there needs to be guidance and an 
acceptance – which is supported by funding – that a minimum level of secretariat support is 
required for all police authorities. The onus is therefore on the APA to argue this case on 
behalf of police authorities. 
Responses to questions and other comments from my in-depth interviews have clearly shown 
that police authority members recognise gaps in their training. It therefore appears to be a 
sensible course of action for the APA to lobby for increased funds to support more training. I 
would also suggest that members of the tripartite system ought to revisit the time 
commitment required from members and the remuneration paid. The increasing demand on 
the time of police authority members makes it extremely difficult for members to serve the 
authority whilst undertaking other work. This can also serve as a disincentive to those who 
are able to offer much needed expertise on police authorities. 
What is clear is that police authority members are pragmatic and they are aware that their 
scope of effectively holding the police to account is potentially restricted by the resource and 
time implications that go along with the terms of their appointment. Police authorities need to 
increase their effectiveness by attracting people with a wider pool of knowledge. In particular 
there is a deficit of members with professional business and financial expertise to augment 
and broaden the knowledge base of the police authority.  The relationship between the police 
service and police authority is in some respects a relation between collaborators rather than 
one between a service provider and a regulator. The evidence from interviews, questionnaires 
and desktop research shows that whilst the functions and the responsibilities of police 
authorities are important, the current structure and arrangement has resulted in police 
authorities being seen as not fit for purpose. Any proposed changes must ensure that even if 
they do not directly increase democracy, they increase accountability by reconnecting the 
citizen with policing.  
 
 
27 
 
Bibliography 
Association of Police Authorities (APA). (2005). Press Release 22/12/2000, APA Website. 
 
Association of Police Authorities (APA). (2006). [Internet], 
<[http://www.apa.police.uk/apa]>, Accessed 20th August, 2006. 
 
Audit Commission. (2003a). Trust in the Public Sector, Audit Commission Public Sector 
Briefing, London. 
 
Audit Commission. (2003b). Trust in Public Institutions, Audit Commission/MORI, London. 
 
Baldwin, R. & Kinsey, R. (1982). Police Powers and Politics, Quartet Books, London. 
 
Boateng, P. (1985) in Baldwin, R & Kinsey, R (eds) (1982) Police Powers and Politics, 
Quartet Books, London: p.238. 
 
Brogden, M. (1977) ‘A Police Authority – A Denial of Conflict’, Sociological Review, 25(2), 
pp.325-349. 
 
Coleman, S. (2005). Direct Representation: Towards a Conversational Democracy, IPPR, 
London. 
Critchley, T.A. (1978). A History of Police in England and Wales 900-1966 (2nd ed), 
Constable, London. 
 
Dalgleish, D., Docking, M., Myhill, A., Sindall, O., & Yarrow, S. (2003). Involving the 
Public: The Role of Police Authorities: Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate, London. 
 
Dalgleish, D., Docking, M., Myhill, A. & Yarrow, S. (2003). The Role of Police Authorities 
in Public Engagement: Home Office Report Online 37/03, Home Office Research, 
Development and Statistics Directorate, London. 
 
Day, P. & Klein, R. (1987). Accountabilities: Five Public Services, Tavistock Publications 
Ltd, London. 
 
Docking, M. (2003). in Public Perceptions of Police Accountability and Decision Making: 
Home Office Online Report 38/03,  Home Office Research, Development and Statistics 
Directorate, London. 
 
Elliott, R. & Nicholls, J. (1996). It’s Good to Talk: Lessons in Public Consultation and 
Feedback, Home Office Police Research Series Paper 22: London. 
 
Hoban, M. (2004). Let’s Trust the People: Exploring a New Approach to the “Regeneration 
and Development” of Poor Areas, unpublished PhD thesis, Brunel University, London. 
 
Howard, M. (2005) Leader of the Conservative Party in a Speech in Manchester, Conservative 
Party, [Internet], <[http://www.manchesterconservatives.com] 
 
Jones, T. & Newburn, T. (1997). Policing After the Act: Police Governance After the Police 
and Magistrates' Courts Act 1994, Policy Studies Institute, London. 
28 
 
 
Jones, T., Newburn, T. & Smith, D. J. (1994). Democracy and Policing, Policy Studies 
Institute, London. 
 
Keohane, R. O. (2002). ‘Commentary on the Democratic Accountability of Non-
Governmental Organizations’, Chicago Journal of International Law, 3(2), pp.477-479. 
 
Leicestershire Police Authority (LPA). (2007). [Internet], <[http://www.leics-
pa.police.uk/about/job-profiles/]>, Accessed on 1st November, 2007. 
 
Loveday, B. & Reid, A. (2003). Going Local. Who Should Run Britain’s Police, Policy 
Exchange, London. 
 
Lustgarten, L. (1986). The Governance of Police, Sweet and Maxwell, London 
 
Marshall, G. (1978). Police Accountability Revisited, In Butler, D. Attitudes to Crime and 
Criminal Justice: Findings from the 1998 British Crime Survey, Home Office Research Study 
200, London 
 
Mulgan, R. (2003). Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracies, 
Palgrave MacMillan, New York. 
 
Oliver, I. (1987). Police, Government and Accountability, Macmillan Press, London. 
 
Parekh Report. (2002). The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain, Runnymede Trust, London. 
 
Policy Studies Institute (PSI). (1997). Independent Committee of Inquiry Into the Role and 
Responsibility of the Police, PSI, London. 
 
Pyper, R. (ed.). (1996). Aspects of Accountability in the British System of Government. Tudor 
Business Publishing, Merseyside. 
 
Raine, J., Dunstan, E. & Patrick, R. (2006). Enhancing Accountability in Local Policing: 
Lessons from Twelve Police Authority Projects, Association of Police Authorities (APA), 
London 
 
Reiner, R. (1991). Chief Constables: Bobbies, Bosses or Bureaucrats?, Clarendon Press, 
Wutton-under-Edge. 
 
Reiner, R. (1992) The Politics of the Police, Harvester Wheatsheaf. Hemel Hempstead 
 
Reiner, R (2000) The Politics of the Police, 3rd edition, Oxford University Press, New York 
 
Scarman Report. (1986). The Brixton Disorders: 10-12 April, 1981, Pelican Books, 
Harmondsworth. 
 
 
